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I Abstract 
This paper deals with the issue of recognising a property right in the human body after 
death.  It advocates that such a right is appropriate given the need for family members to 
have increased control over the treatment of their loved one's remains.  Thus a property 
right over human corpses is proposed, in favour of the next of kin, for the purposes of 
ensuring proper burial.  This conclusion was reached after consideration of the recent 
New Zealand Supreme Court case Takamore v Clarke, the Gravatt family experience and 
Toi Moko.  Themes present in this paper include the primacy of the wishes of the 
surviving over those of the dead and the significance of communal decision-making in 
matters concerning death and grief.   
 
II Introduction 
 
Issues relating to death are undoubtedly some of the most trying and controversial for our 
legal system, made a practical nightmare thanks to the literally universal application.  It is 
therefore unsurprising that the same debates continue to resurface.  This paper fuels that 
eternal fire by reconsidering the prospect of property rights in the human corpse.  
However, at the risk of sounding self-serving, the time has never been better for a 
reconsideration of key contentions.  In New Zealand over the past few years the Law 
Society has held 'Death and the Law' conferences where a myriad of related issues have 
found interest and provoked critical analysis.  In addition, two days ago the Law 
Commission published an issues paper considering a review on the Burial and Cremation 
Act 1964.1  Thus, New Zealand is listening.   
 
Moreover, certain recent events have created ripe opportunity for a new viewpoint on the 
property in bodies debate.  This paper considers specifically; the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Takamore v Clarke,2 the experiences of the Gravatt family and the Toi Moko.  A 
property right is the strongest form of protection in our common law system, offering the 
surest form of redress for any wrong.  Alas, historically fears of the commodifaction of 
the human body have negatively affected any debate connecting property rights to the 
body.  The three case studies considered in this paper offer new ammunition for the 
destruction of fears surrounding the recognition of a property right, ultimately calling for 
utilisation of the law's strongest form of protection to extend to the remains of the 
deceased.  
  
1  Law Commission The Legal Framework for Burial and Cremation in New Zealand: A First 
Principles Review (NZLC IP34, 2013). 
2  Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116. 
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The first part of this paper necessarily digests the relevant historical case law, concluding 
that there is a legitimate basis on which to advocate for law reform.  The age-old rule that 
the corpse is nullius in rebus is rejected.  Next, important practical considerations are 
weighed concluding that a development of the 'quasi-property' approach from the United 
States jurisprudence would be suitable.  Thus a corpse ought to be considered an object of 
property rights but only for the limited purpose of proper burial.  This position is 
supported by analysis of the importance of ensuring proper burial, not only for public 
decency reasons but also more significantly as an aid in the grieving process for families.   
 
The next section of discussion focuses on the most appropriate subject in which the 
property rights ought to vest.  This is a particularly controversial inquiry, as identified 
through the case of Takamore v Clarke.  Ultimately it is considered prudent that the next 
of kin ought to be entrusted with the exclusive control of the deceased's remains but that 
this right correlates with an obligation to consult with all interested parties.  This is an 
extremely important decision in the New Zealand context as it affords the best 
opportunity for collective decision-making, which is vital to the adherence of tikanga 
Māori.   
 
The second inquiry outlined in this paper focuses on the potential for recognition of a 
property right in human remains on the basis of a skilled transformation of those remains.  
This proposition is considered firstly with reference to the Gravatt family tragedy, which 
highlights the tension between families and medical professionals with regard to 
autopsies.  And secondly, with regard to modern day museum exhibits such as Toi Moko.  
The conclusion here is also reached due to influence of tikanga.  Primarily the 'skill and 
labour' argument is not considered convincing or influential in our current jurisprudence.  
Ultimately though, even if there were to be a property right recognised in regard to tissue 
used in research or public display, it is imperative that this right be subordinate to that of 
the whānau's in order to ensure non-interference with proper burial and tikanga.  
 
III Foundational Case Law 
A A General Rule that there is No Property in a Corpse 
The no property in a corpse rule has been inherited in New Zealand from a long line of 
English case law dating from the early 19th century.  However, it has recently become 
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clear that the rule is based on a "murky" foundation.3  It is apt to discuss the relevant case 
law in a chronological format in order to view how the adoption of the 'no property in the 
body' rule came to be.  It is this author's view that there are distinct leaps and bounds 
made throughout the foundational cases, based largely on incorrect interpretations of 
previous authorities.  
 
Haynes' Case4 is famously heralded as the first authority for the proposition that there can 
be no property in a human corpse.  That case involved the rather gruesome taking of 
several winding sheets from the cadavers of four buried corpses.  The report of the case is 
brief but the legal question considered is clearly stated: could this be a felony theft?  The 
justices concerned themselves with deducing who owned the winding sheets, as the 
sheets needed to belong to someone in order for the felony to be made out.  It was held 
that the sheets were the property of whoever owned them at the time of burial.  
Importantly the justices consequently held that the deceased persons could not be deemed 
the owners of the winding sheets as "a dead body being but a lump of earth has no 
capacity"5 to own property.  It is this proposition that has been misconstrued as authority 
for the general principle that a corpse is nullius in rebus.  Haynes' Case concludes that a 
dead body cannot be the subject in which property is vested.  Suggesting that a human 
body cannot be the object of property rights is an entirely different legal question.6     
 
This misconception was immortalised by Sir William Blackstone.7  In his Commentaries 
on the Laws of England, Blackstone noted, "…the heir may have a property in the 
monuments and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet has none in his body or ashes."  There 
was no citation given, but the subsequent sentence was made with reference to Haynes' 
Case,8 and thus the impression given is that Blackstone indeed misconstrued the decision 
in that case.9  Importantly though the wealth of jurisprudence following Blackstone's 
commentary adopted his view.  Sir Edward Coke in his periodical reiterated the principle, 
  
3  Nicola Peart "Immediately Post-death: The Body, Body Parts and Stored Human Tissue" (paper 
presented to New Zealand Law Society Family Law and Property Law – "Death and the Law" 
Intensive Conference, May 2012) 115 at 119. 
4  Haynes’ Case [1614] 12 Co Rep 113, 77 E R 1389. 
5  Haynes' Case. 
6  This point has been made in more recent commentary on the issue; see Cordelia Thomas "A 
Framework For The Collection, Retention And Use Of Human Body Parts" (PhD Dissertation, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 2006) at 57, 
7  William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (15th ed, A Stratham for T Cadell and W 
Davies, London, 1809) Vol 2 at 429.   
8  William Blackstone, above n 7 at 429, n m. 
9  Nicola Peart takes the view that it was in fact subsequent cases, which misconstrued Blackstone's 
commentary in finding that there is no property in a body; see above n 3 at 119.   
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confirming that "[t]he burial of the Cadaver (that is, caro data vermibus) is nullius in 
bonis and belongs to Ecclesiastical cognisance."10   
 
Judicially the principle was first (appropriately) applied in R v Sharpe.11  R v Sharpe 
involved a son's unlawful attempt to disinter his mother's body from an unconsecrated 
burial site in order to rebury her in a consecrated ground with his father; the deceased's 
husband in life.  The defendant, Sharpe, had argued that as the deceased's child he had a 
right to, and in, her corpse.12  In response to this argument, Justice Erle held 
unequivocally that "[o]ur law recognises no property in a corpse"13 and that "there is no 
authority for saying that relationship [of child to parent] will justify the taking a corpse 
away from the grave where it has been buried."14  Unsurprisingly no authority was 
provided in support of these propositions.  However, it does appear that Erle J had a 
policy objective in mind.  Erle J noted "the protection of the grave at common law, as 
contradistinguished from ecclesiastical protection to consecrated ground, depends upon 
this form of indictment."15  The indictment Erle J refers to is the action of removing a 
corpse from its grave.  Thus his Honour feared that if the Court were to allow the 
defendant's defence in this case, the effect of the decision would be to expose common 
law graveyards to prolific bodysnatching.  It was relevant in this case that the deceased's 
body had been buried in the Churchyard of a Protestant congregation and therefore not on 
property subject to Ecclesiastical cognisance.  Erle J was careful not to "lay down a rule 
which might lessen the only protection the law affords in respect of the burials of 
dissenters."16  While the context in which this policy consideration is discussed, is not 
directly relevant today the intention to avoid a bodysnatching free-for-all is of obvious, 
continued importance.  
 
Throughout the New Zealand case law the most commonly cited authority for the 
proposition that there can be no property in a human corpse is the case of Williams v 
Williams.17  Mr Crookenden, the deceased, had advised his friend Eliza Williams of his 
express wishes as to the disposal of his remains.  Mr Crookenden's instructions were 
  
10  Edward Coke Institutes of the Laws and Customs of England (17th ed, W Clarke, London, 1817) Vol 
3 at 203. 
11  R v Sharpe [1857] 169 ER 959. 
12  At [163]. 
13  At [163].  
14  At [163]. 
15  At [163]. 
16  At [163]. 
17  Williams v Williams [1882] 20 Ch D 659; first cited in New Zealand in Murdoch v Rhind and 
Murdoch [1945] NZLR 425 (SC) at 427, and most recently in Takamore v Clarke, above n 2 at [113] 
per McGrath, Blanchard and Tipping JJ. 
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referenced in a codicil to his will.  He desired that he be cremated, in accordance with his 
Roman Catholic beliefs.  His ashes were then to be buried in a Wedgwood vase in 
consecrated ground.  The vase had been bequeathed to Miss Williams for this purpose.  
However at that time of Mr Crookenden's death, cremation was illegal in England.  Mr 
Crookenden's surviving wife had thus had his body interred in a cemetery, with the 
acknowledgement and authority of Mr Crookenden's executors.  Upon this occurrence 
Miss Williams had applied to the Court to have the body disinterred on the pretence that 
she intended to relocate it to a consecrated burial site.  She was awarded a disinterment 
licence but instead of relocating the body, she had it transported to Italy to be cremated.  
Fortunately for the realm of property law scholarship, Miss Williams then had the gall to 
sue the estate for the cost of the cremation vacation. 
 
In Williams v Williams Kay J discussed at length the claims of the parties to the remains.  
Most notable for the purposes of this discussion, his Honour confirmed R v Sharpe, 
holding that neither Miss Williams, nor the executors owned the remains as there is no 
property in a dead body.18  At this stage the general rule appears irrevocably attached to 
this area of the law.  Kay J then went further and outlined the duties and rights that do 
arise with regard to burial, concluding "after the death of a man, his executors have a 
right to the custody and possession of his body (although they have no property in it) 
until it is properly buried."19  As is characteristic of these early cases the authority on 
which Kay J based his conclusion as to the custodial rights is somewhat questionable.   
 
His Honour referred to R v Scott and R v Fox, which are in essence the same case.20  R v 
Fox was a proceeding based on an application brought by the Solicitor-General for the 
release of a dead body held unlawfully by the defendants.  The principal defendant, 
Francis Scott, had been a gaoler of the prison in which the deceased had been 
incarcerated at his death.  Scott maintained that he was entitled to keep the remains of the 
prisoner until a debt owed to Scott by the deceased was paid.  The Court of the Queen's 
Bench ordered the release of the body to the executors, but no mention of a right or duty 
vested in the executors was made.  Instead the case turned on Scott's impropriety in 
obstructing a proper burial.21  Nonetheless Kay J viewed this case as authority for the 
position that an executor has a right to possession of the deceased's remains upon death.   
  
18  Williams v Williams, above n 17, at 662–663. 
19  At 665. 
20  See R v Fox (1841) 2 QB 246; R v Scott (1842) 2 QB 248. R v Scott was the prosecution of the 
defendant in R v Fox on the grounds of misconduct in public office, based on the same set of facts. 
This is made distinct in Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [178]. 
21  R v Fox, above n 20, at 247. 
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The final point of Kay J's reasoning, of considerable importance to the current inquiry, is 
the treatment of Mr Crookenden's will.  Kay J unambiguously held that testamentary 
instructions as to the disposition of a testator's body couldn't be enforced.22  Miss 
Williams was thus not entitled to the costs of cremation, as she had interfered with the 
executors claim over the body and moreover she had no basis on which to rely on the 
testator's wishes as enforceable obligations.  Thus the general rule established in these 
foundational cases, unavoidably, is that the human corpse is incapable of being the object 
of property rights.  There is, however a limited right vested in the executor in order to 
enable proper burial, arguably tantamount to a possessory right and a correlative duty to 
bury.  As will be explored further, the questionable authority on which this base position 
rests has had obvious effects on the strength of the rule, and its subsequent application 
through the case law.   
B Quasi-Property: The United States 
The United States jurisprudence is worth considering separately as it has, from the outset, 
been more favourable towards recognising property rights in a dead body.  In Renihan et 
al v Wright et al23 the Supreme Court of Indiana directly considered the question of rights 
in a body for the purpose of burial.  The respondents were parents whose daughter had 
predeceased them.  They had instructed the appellants, funeral directors and undertakers, 
to store the remains of their deceased child until such a time when they were ready to 
organise her burial.  Instead the appellants had in some way disposed of the body and 
were refusing to explain where it had gone.24  The basis for the appeal was an application 
for demurrer of the Wrights' original claim for compensation, which had been upheld in 
the lower courts.  The case is particularly relevant for the purposes of this inquiry as the 
appellants argued that the Wrights could not maintain any cause of action.  The appellants 
asserted that control of the corpse is a right vested in the executor and not the next of 
kin.25  Thus Coffey J was required to make a ruling on the question of a parent's right in 
the body of their deceased child.  
 
In determination of the issue Coffey J quotes, with glowing confirmation, the flowery 
language of the Honourable Samuel B. Ruggles on the proper treatment of a body fit for 
burial.  Mr Ruggles explains that:26 
  
22  Williams v Williams, above n 17, at 665. 
23  Renihan et al v Wright et al 125 Ind 536 (1890). 
24  The appellants had merely informed the Wrights that their daughter was "in Ohio" at 538. 
25  At 537. 
26  At 542–543. 
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much of the apparent difficulty of this subject arises from a false and needless 
assumption, in holding that nothing is property that has not a pecuniary value. The 
real question is not of the disposable, marketable value of a corpse, or its remains, as 
an article of traffic, but it is of the sacred and inherent right to its custody, in order 
decently to bury it, and secure its undisturbed repose.  The dogma of the English 
ecclesiastical law, that a child has no such claim … no peculiar interest in the dead 
body of its parent, is so utterly inconsistent with every enlightened perception of 
personal right … that its adoption would be an eternal disgrace to American 
jurisprudence. 
Delighting in Mr Ruggles' "accurate and elaborate … statement of the law"27 Coffey J 
found that "the bodies of the dead belong to the surviving relatives, in the order of 
inheritance, as other property and that they have the right to the custody and burial of the 
same."28  Coffey J was explicit in his policy motivations for ruling as he did.  It was 
considered paramount that the right to protect a loved one's remains from 
misappropriation and to ensure that proper burial is achieved and maintained ought to be 
vindicated by the Court.29  In addition, Coffey J considered the prospect of vesting the 
right of control in the executor or administrator to be absurd and impractical given the 
law regarding letters of administration.30  It was held that the next of kin will generally be 
more practically and appropriately placed to decide matters of burial and to protect the 
deceased from disrespect after burial.31 
 
Elsewhere in the United States the same sorts of policy considerations resulted in a 
slightly weaker right for families.  The Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered a 
similar situation in Pierce v Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery.32  That case specifically 
involved a determination of the equitable jurisdiction for regulating requests relating to 
the disinterment and reinterment of cadavers.  In dealing with the application though, 
Potter J made some important decisions in principle that have been cited on numerous 
occasions.  Potter J considered the policy issues that were highlighted as crucial by Mr 
Ruggles' (as cited in Renihan) but nonetheless held that the nullius in rebus rule, 
influential in common law cases, was convincing.  Thus the American jurisprudence 
inherited a 'halfway' approach:33 
Although, as we have said, the body is not property in the usually recognized sense 
of the word, yet we may consider it as a sort of quasi property, to which certain 
  
27  At 542. 
28  At 543. 
29  At 540–541. 
30  At 541. 
31  At 543. 
32  Pierce v Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery 10 RI 227 (1872) (RISC). 
33  At 11. 
10 To Rest in Peace: A Proprietary Analysis of the Treatment of Bodies After Death 
 
persons may have rights … But the person having charge of it cannot be considered 
as the owner of it in any sense whatever; he holds it only as a sacred trust for the 
benefit of all who may from family or friendship have an interest in it, and we think 
that a court of equity may well regulate it as such, and change the custody if 
improperly managed.  
 
Potter J discusses at length in his judgment the importance of there being a remedy to 
associate with the right of a family member to deal with the burial of a loved one.34  This 
principle is of a similar thread to Coffey J's discussion of the need for the law to protect a 
family's interest.  However there is an inherent fear present in Potter J's judgement of the 
danger of conferring ownership rights on families with regard to the bodies of their loved 
ones.  Thus the quasi property judgment solution arises as a way to reconcile the danger 
of conferring ownership privileges on family members and the need for the law to 
facilitate a family's ability to secure proper burial.35   
 
As is almost always the case, the use of the term 'quasi' does nothing to truly clarify the 
situation.  However it is fair to conclude that even this weaker protection of the surviving 
family's right to control dealings with the corpse is 'property-like'.  Numerous cases, all 
involving differing property and equity frameworks, have considered the exact nature of 
the family's right since Pierce v Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery.36  Unfortunately 
these authorities do little to relieve the confusion as to the parameters of this right, and 
are not worth direct consideration here.  However it is useful to note that the trust-like 
right has been confirmed as good law at the federal level.  What can be fairly garnered 
from the American jurisprudence is that the Judges are amenable to recognising a 
property right in a deceased person's body to enable the next of kin to obtain and maintain 
proper burial for the deceased.37  Also significant is that this right, from the outset, has 
been phrased with reference to the deceased's next of kin.  Thus it is entirely plausible, 
and probable, that this will mean a number of relatives will collectively hold the right in 
some instances.   
  
34  At 7 and 9. 
35  See Cordelia Thomas, "A Framework For The Collection, Retention And Use Of Human Body Parts" 
(PhD Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2006) at 64. 
36  See for instance Brotherton v Cleveland (1991) 923 F 2d 477, 482 (6th Cir); Whaley v County of 
Tuscola 58 F 3d 1111(1995) (6th Cir) and Arnaud v Odom 870 F 2d 304 (1989) (5th Cir).  
37  Support for this view can be found in Cordelia Thomas, above n 35, at 64-65.  This finding may 
however contradict the finding of the Chief Justice in Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [69]. This is 
further outlined below. 
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C The 'Doodeward' Exception 
The next case of particular import is the High Court of Australia decision in Doodeward v 
Spence (Doodeward).38  This case signals the second key aspect of the historical 
jurisprudence, an exception to the nullius in bonis rule.  Doodeward involved very 
peculiar facts and fittingly peculiar judgments.  The subject matter of the case was a two-
headed foetus that had been stillborn and preserved in a jar.  The plurality considered that 
the foetus could be the object of property rights as it was not of the same kind as a mere 
corpse awaiting burial.  Griffiths J held that:39 
when a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with a human body 
or part of a human body in his lawful possession that it has acquired some attributes 
differentiating it from a mere corpse awaiting burial, he acquires a right to retain 
possession of it. 
Thus this case was a significant development with regard to the general rule.  Griffiths J 
essentially carved out an exception for situations where the subject matter can be said to 
have been sufficiently dealt with by the lawful exercise of work or skill, so as to 
transform it beyond a mere corpse.  As is discussed below, the requirement that the 
corpse be relevantly and sufficiently transformed is vital.  
 
In the United Kingdom the ratio in Doodeward was unequivocally confirmed in the case 
of R v Kelly, R v Lindsay.40  That case concerned the theft of multiple human specimens 
housed by the Royal College of Surgeons.  The question on appeal was whether the 
remains were subject to the general rule that the body is nullius in rebus, or whether the 
Royal College of Surgeons could have title in the specimens.41  Rose LJ applied Griffith 
J's reasoning from Doodeward, concluding that specimens are "capable of being property 
… if they have acquired different attributes by virtue of the application of skill, such as 
dissection or preservation techniques, for exhibition or teaching purposes."42  This case 
deserves specific mention as it concerned specimens and therefore parts of a corpse and 
not the intact body.  Rose LJ is careful to extend application of the Doodeward exception 
to parts of a corpse.43  The conceptual difficulty with an exception for bodies that have 
been transformed through skill and labour is that it inevitably leads to some fairly 
arbitrary line drawing as to what constitutes a transformation.  It is therefore necessary to 
directly examine the role of the Doodeward exception in any proposed framework for the 
recognition of property rights in a dead body.  
  
38  Doodeward v Spence [1908] HCA 45; (1908) 6 CLR 406 (31 July 1908). 
39  At 47. 
40  R v Kelly, R v Lindsay [1999] QB 621, [1998] 3 All ER 741, CA. 
41  At 623. 
42  At 631. 
43  At 631. 
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IV The New Zealand Picture: Takamore v Clarke 
A Factual Background 
The case of Takamore v Clarke44 is by far New Zealand's most comprehensive judicial 
consideration of the conceptual issues relating to property in bodies after death.  The case 
involved a dispute among family members as to the ultimate burial site of Jim Takamore.  
Takamore was a native of the Tuhoe tribe in the North Island.  However he had resided 
for the last twenty years of his life in Christchurch with his partner Ms Clarke, the 
respondent.  Mr Takamore and Ms Clarke also had two children who had been raised in 
Christchurch, entirely separated from their Takamore family in the North Island.  Upon 
Mr Takamore's death Ms Clarke was appointed executrix and determined that her 
partner's body would be interred at a local cemetery, Ruru Lawn Cemetery.45  This 
decision conflicted with the wishes of Mr Takamore's immediate family still living in 
Kutarere in the Bay of Plenty.  As a result the Kutarere family drove half the length of the 
country with the impetus of obtaining Mr Takamore's remains for reburial at their hapū 
urupa.  This is, in its crudest form, a body-snatching case.  However it is important to 
acknowledge that the taking of a body from one hapū to be buried in the location of 
another is not considered the negative action under tikanga as it is under the common 
law.46 
 
In the lower courts Ms Clarke succeeded in her application for a licence to have her 
partner's body returned to her in Christchurch.47  Before the Supreme Court Ms Clarke 
argued that she had the legal right to determine the specifics of Mr Takamore's burial by 
reason of her position as executrix.  It was argued that the executrix, where appointed, 
has the only recognisable duty to ensure proper burial, and that this duty correlated to the 
remedy of disinterment and remittance where it was interfered with.  Ms Clarke 
characterised her position as executor in the nature of a trust, subject to the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the High Court.48  In opposition to this, the Takamore family argued that 
the dispute ought to be governed by Tuhoe tikanga and not the common law.  Tuhoe 
  
44  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2. 
45  While Mr Takamore had never discussed his exact wishes as to burial with his partner, there was 
evidence led in the High Court that Mr Takamore had intimated to his work colleagues that he would 
like to be buried in Ruru Lawn Cemetery.  
46  Considerable expert evidence as to tikanga was led at the first instance hearing of this case.  It was 
conclusive that the taking of a body after death is considered a boost of the mana, or personal esteem, 
of the deceased.  See Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [69]. 
47  See Clarke v Takamore [2010] 2 NZLR 525 (HC) and Takamore v Clarke [2011] NZCA 587. 
48  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [6]. 
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tikanga observed by Mr Takamore's hapū is strict on the importance of having members 
returned in death to the land where their life begun.  The maintenance of a strong 
relationship between people and the land is a crucial aspect of tikanga for all Māori.49  It 
was argued that this tikanga principle ought to be incorporated into the common law, with 
the effect of nullifying any possessory right of Ms Clarke's.50 
B Elias CJ   
The five judges on the Supreme Court were unanimous in their decision to dismiss the 
appeal and order Mr Takamore's remains to be remitted to Christchurch.  However there 
were three separate judgments delivered and particular consideration of the Chief 
Justice's speech, in addition to the Majority's, is prudent given her Honour's treatment of 
the property issues.  The question of Ms Clarke having any kind of proprietary right over 
her husband's remains was carefully considered by Elias CJ but ultimately her Honour 
held that such a right would be too dangerous.  Her Honour documented the nuances of 
the legal jurisprudence relevant but then, with respect, subsequently refused to recognise 
any general rule or entitlement as to who decides matters of burial.  Instead her decision 
was made after an assessment on the facts before her; that Ms Clarke ought to determine 
the resting place of her partner based on what appears to be a balance of factors (or, in 
reality, a gut instinct).51   
 
However, Elias CJ's reasoning does provide a valid analysis of the relevant authorities 
and useful considerations for the present inquiry.  First, Elias CJ appeared to be an 
advocate for the general proposition handed down from the English authorities that there 
can be no property in a corpse.  Her Honour mentioned Chambers J's judgment from the 
Court of Appeal, rejecting his views that an executor might be able to maintain an action 
in conversion or detinue if the corpse of a deceased person under their direction is 
interfered with.52  Elias concluded that this could not be good law, as it would result in a 
direct contradiction of the nullius in rebus principle.53   
 
Second, when dealing with the question of recognising a specific entitlement in the 
executor to determine matters of burial, and therefore a concurrent right to the possession 
of the body, Elias CJ held that such a proposal would lead to a myriad of 
  
49  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [14]. 
50  At [5]. 
51  At [12]. 
52  These views were shared by the majority in the Court of Appeal decision also. See Takamore v 
Clarke, above n 47, [264]. 
53  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [70]. 
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impracticalities.54  Inter alia a will may not always convey the reality of the family 
circumstances at the time of the death of the testator, as it may be out of date. This 
eventuality would be "embarrassing" and inconvenient for the family and the courts 
alike.55  The flow on from these issues is of course delay which, given the delicacy of the 
subject matter and the necessary public interest inherent in expedient burial, would be 
unacceptable.56  Finally Elias CJ bemoaned the likelihood that family members will wish 
to challenge the decisions made by the executors, much as is the case on the facts.57  
 
In coming to her conclusion the Chief Justice decides to follow the theme in Jones v 
Dodd,58 a South Australian case.  There, Perry J "rejected the view that there is a rule of 
law that confers the right to determine how the deceased's body is to be treated on a 
putative administrator."59  The decision of who was entitled to determine dealings with a 
body after death was deemed a matter for the Court to decide in all the circumstances of 
the case, if and when a dispute arises.60  Perry J paid homage to all of the competing 
desires and interests present in that case61 but made a final ruling in accordance with the 
deceased's choices during his life.62  Elias CJ's ultimate decision mirrors this approach.  
The key reason the Chief Justice gave for ordering the remittance of Mr Takamore's body 
to Christchurch was that it would mirror the decision Mr Takamore made during his 
lifetime to live with his partner and children, and leave Kutarere behind.63 
C Tipping, McGrath and Blanchard JJ 
The majority judgement in Takamore v Clarke, delivered by McGrath J similarly covered 
the relevant authorities but does not dismiss them as the Chief Justice does.  Instead the 
majority opinion was almost an adoption of the English position.  However, McGrath J is 
sceptical of the historical jurisprudence, noting as has been aforementioned that the 
judgement of Kay J in Williams v Williams relied on a significant misinterpretation of the 
earlier case law.64  Nonetheless Williams v Williams is held to be the law in New Zealand 
  
54  At [64]–[65]. 
55   At [65]. 
56  At [66]. 
57  At [66]. 
58  Jones v Dodd [1999] SASC 125; confirmed in Dodd v Jones [1999] SASC 458. 
59  Jones v Dodd, above n 58, at [45]–[46] as quoted in Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [76]. 
60  Jones v Dodd, above n 58, at [51]. 
61  At [53], [55] and [56] 
62  At [60] note that Perry J considers that the relevant cultural factors to uphold where possible are those 
beliefs held by the deceased. At [64] Perry J notes that the desires of the deceased's surviving family 
members are important but not determinative. 
63  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [103]. 
64  At [177]. 
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to the extent that it was considered and affirmed in Murdoch v Rhind and Murdoch.65  In 
that case Northcroft J held that the law regarding the treatment of bodies after death is 
clear:66 
Not only has the executor the right, he has the duty, of disposing of the body of the 
deceased. It is for him to say how and where the body shall be disposed of. 
Accordingly the majority's decision focused on the role of the executor in determining 
matters of burial. 
 
The majority's judgment is motivated by the intention to find a general rule to apply in 
cases of this sort; specifically cases where there is a disagreement between family 
members as to disposal of the corpse and one of the parties is the executor.67  McGrath J 
considered the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tapora v Tapora68 to be of worthy 
mention.  That case involved an executor on the one hand who intended to enforce the 
testator's wishes to be buried in the Cook Islands, and the surviving partner on the other 
hand, who willed for the deceased's body to remain in Auckland.  The Court of Appeal 
confirmed the legal analysis of the lower court, holding that the executor's right to dictate 
burial matters is primal, to the exclusion of all others, including the widow.69  The 
majority considered these decisions as evidence that a general rule, vesting in the 
executor the right to control matters of burial, is good law in New Zealand.  Thus they 
expressly disagree with the Chief Justice as to her stance that there can be no set rule.70  
 
McGrath J's ultimate decision on this point is worth setting out in full as it is an excellent 
summary of the motivation for having a general rule of some kind:71 
We also see the continuation of the rule as to the personal representative's role as 
highly desirable. It serves the need for a person with authority to decide on the 
manner and place of disposal of the body when differences arise amongst those who 
were close to the deceased or who, for other reasons, might be expected in the 
normal course to make the necessary arrangements. Having such a rule providing for 
a decision-maker is both practical and convenient. It will often avoid anyone going 
to court over their differences because the parties accept or acquiesce in what the 
personal representative decides. In this way, the rule will often serve the desirability 
of expedition in a matter which is the occasion of feelings of great grief and loss, 
while also allowing relevant matters to be addressed. 
  
65  Murdoch v Rhind and Murdoch [1945] NZLR 425 (SC). 
66  Murdoch v Rhind, above n 65, at 427. 
67  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [118]. 
68  Tapora v Tapora CA206/96, 28 August 1996, cited in Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [118]. 
69  Tapora v Tapora, above n 68, at 3. 
70  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [152]. 
71  At [153]. 
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Beyond what was directly on point in the case at hand, the majority considered the 
application of a rule, which would preference an executor, to cases where no executor 
had been appointed, or could be found.72  This discussion also led to an adoption of the 
law in England and Wales.73  In accordance with the finding of the High Court of 
England and Wales in 2008,74 the majority here decided the succession law hierarchy 
ought to be adopted to cover cases of intestacy.75  Thus, where necessary, the right to 
control matters of burial will vest in the person with the best claim to the letters of 
administration.76  Specifically this matter will be governed by the High Court Rules77 
with the High Court maintaining its ability to appoint an administrator where necessary, 
as per s 6 Administration Act 1969.78  Whoever wields the power was deemed to be 
under an expectation to consult with other interested parties such as friends and family as 
to their wishes.79  However the majority held that imposing an obligation to do so would 
be too impractical.80 
 
V Analysis and Proposal – Looking Forward 
A The Underlying Proposition: a Corpse is Nullius in Rebus? 
As examination of the historical case law suggests the general principle that a human 
corpse is nullius in rebus has no substantial foundation on which to stand.  As a general 
proposition it is surprisingly without substance.  Its development is not a story of careful 
policy discussion and comprehensive, principled analysis.81  Instead, Blackstone and 
Coke's commentary has been taken for gospel.  As a result, adopting the rule in modern 
cases requires explanatory caveats describing its murky foundation, as was evidenced in 
McGrath J's judgment in Takamore v Clarke.82  Thus conceptually, this author struggles 
to point to a convincing justification for denying a property right ad infinitum. 
 
  
72  At [124]. 
73  For completeness, the law on this point is also the same in Australia. See Smith v Tamworth Ctiy 
Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 80 (SC). 
74  Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston [2008] EWHC 1387, [2008] 2 FLR 1225 (QB). 
75  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [125] and [144]–[147]. 
76  At [146]. 
77  High Court Rules, r 27.35(3) and r 27.35(4). 
78  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [147].  
79  At [164]. 
80  At [164].  
81  This can be contrasted with cases that have considered the proposition of recognising property rights 
in bodies or body parts of the living. See for instance Moore v Regents of the University of California 
[1988] 249 Cal Rptr 494 and Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2010] QB 1 (CA (Civ Div)). 
82  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [177]. 
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In Renihan v Wright, Mr Ruggles commented that many view property as a legal concept 
capable of attaching to commodities only; that is, things of value, and therefore a corpse 
is an inappropriate object for property rights to attach.83  This view appears misguided.  
In truth, it does not accord at all with the first principles of property law to suggest that an 
item needs to have a pecuniary value to be the object of property rights.  As Felix Cohen 
instructs "valueless property" is entirely plausible; there are many seemingly worthless 
things that are protected by property rights, and many valuable things that are not.84  Thus 
a doctrine or test that sets market value as the benchmark for attracting property is 
skewed from the start.  Arguably, if property law is going to attach any meaning to the 
value of a thing, that value ought to be subjective, idiosyncratic.  The emphasis on human 
bodies having a value quite apart from a pecuniary market assessment is key in viewing a 
place for corpses in the property realm.  This paper argues that the quantifiable value in a 
corpse worth recognising, and protecting at law, is that perceived by the friends and 
family left behind. 
 
It has been implied from Coke and Blackstone that the motivation historically was a 
religious precept.85  That is, the body was considered the temple of the Holy Ghost and to 
do other than bury it and let it remain buried would be sacrilegious.86  In the broader 
sense the fear here is that a property right in the human corpse would allow the right-
holder unrestricted use of the body.  This then creates the opportunity for actions of a 
character disrespectful to the dead or insulting to the sanctity of society generally.  The 
risk of socially undesirable outcomes is an unavoidable danger of recognising an entirely 
unlimited property right in any context, and thus it is common practice to limit general 
property rights in numerous ways.   
 
The most basic of property rights, the right to own land, is also the clearest example of 
the normalcy in our society of practical limitations.87  Thus, this paper proposes that any 
property right recognised in the human body after death would be constrained by the 
public decency laws that exist at present.  Most appropriately, the requirement in the 
Crimes Act 1961 to respect the dignity of the dead.88  This could quite conceivably 
encompass a prohibition on the true commodification of corpses.  That is, laws which 
prevent the buying and selling of dead bodies and body parts could be maintained.  As 
  
83  Renihan v Wright, above n 23. 
84  Felix S Cohen "Dialogue on Private Property" (1954-1955) Rutgers L Rev 357, at 363-364. 
85  Yearworth, above n 81, at [31]. 
86  At [31].  
87  Land ownership is governed by common law doctrines such as the torts of nuisance and Rylands v 
Fletcher and also by the Land Transfer Act 1952 and the Property Law Act 2007, among others.  
88  Crimes Act 1961, s 150. 
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Peter Skegg pointed out in 1975, characterisation of the right to ensure burial as a 
property right "need not bring about very far-reaching changes in the law relating to 
corpses… The property interest in the corpse could be treated as one which could not be 
divested."89  This paper advocates for this conception.90 
 
There is also a strong concern that our laws ought to facilitate and ensure proper, timely 
burial, which may be impeded if a property right is legitimised.91  Timely burial is 
undeniably a legitimate policy consideration for public health and safety reasons.92  
However, this author rejects that recognising the existence of a property right in a corpse 
need necessarily have the causal affect of delaying expedient burial.  Firstly because a 
right-holder who refuses to ensure timely burial with some unnatural motivation, would 
come under the ambit of s 150 of the Crimes Act, as referred to above.  Delaying burial in 
a manner that degrades public welfare would satisfy s 150(a).93  Thus attempts do delay 
of that kind could be swiftly dealt with.  Secondly because in cases where there are 
disagreements among family members, a property right will afford clarity to the situation 
and prevent disputes form escalating.  That is so, as there will be no doubt as to whom is 
responsible for the decision-making.  The case of Takamore v Clarke is simply the most 
recent example of the danger of confusion in areas of the law such as this.  It is this 
author's view that a change in the law that recognised a property right would remove the 
ability for disputes of the kind in Takamore v Clarke to escalate to such a level. 
B Recognising a General Rule 
Thus this author has no issue conceptually with translating property law concepts to the 
human body after death.  The shaky historical foundation of the current law, creates the 
opportunity for continued reconsideration of the applicability of a law change for that 
purpose.  This paper advocates for recognition of a property right vested in the next of 
kin, in order to obtain and maintain proper burial.  This approach is an acknowledgement 
in support of the majority opinion in the Supreme Court decision of Takamore v Clarke, 
to the extent that the justices deemed a general rule necessary.  However, as will be 
exemplified, this author deems it more appropriate to vest this property right in family 
members rather than in accordance with succession laws, given New Zealand's unique 
cultural landscape.  This approach is most akin to the law in the United States, an 
  
89  PDG Skegg "Human Corpses, Medical Specimens and the Law of Property" (1975) 4 Anglo-
Am.L.Rev. 412 at 417. 
90  Another important limitation is the ability for coroners to conduct autopsies, particularly in cases of 
suspicious deaths.   
91  Yearworth, above n 81, at [31]. 
92  See In re Blagdon Cemetery [2002] 3 WLR 603.  
93  Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CA150.01]. 
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uncommon path for our courts to follow, but by no means unheard of.  In the avoidance 
of doubt, this author does conceive the proposed property right as conferring exclusive 
control over the corpse and therefore proprietary in every sense of the word.  As has been 
mentioned, the 'quasi-property' approach has often been interpreted as less than common 
law 'property'.   
 
McGrath J's comments outlining the need for a general rule as to who shoulders the 
responsibility of ensuring proper burial are convincing.  An ultimate decision maker is an 
unavoidable necessity in order for this area of the law to have any sort of clarity and 
efficiency.  Elias CJ's findings were based on a preference for Court guidance on an 
individual case basis.  This author sympathises with such a stance given the difficult facts 
of Takamore v Clarke.  Realistically there was an obvious reluctance to set a precedent 
that may be construed to prefer either the pakeha immediate family or the Māori hapū in 
these matters.  However by characterising her decision as a rejection of both of the 
parties' submissions, Elias CJ's decision is essentially a 'wait and see' solution.  With 
respect this is unsatisfactory.  It means that the court is required to make every decision 
of this kind and that individuals have no ability to predict for themselves who is in the 
right.  It is the author's opinion that this is an unhelpful stance given the already confused 
state of the law, a position that serves to leave the door open for further challenges of a 
similar kind.   
 
The proposed default rule needs to be afforded the strength of a property right.  All of the 
authorities previously discussed agree on one principle matter: that the corpse ought to 
have proper burial and that someone has a duty to ensure that this happens.  With this in 
mind, this author finds the comments made by Potter J in Pierce v Proprietors of Swan 
Point Cemetery illuminating.  Potter J discussed the requirement for every right to have a 
sufficient remedy.  At present, the right (however it is characterised) to control burial 
matters is enforced only upon application for exhumation, as in Takamore v Clarke.94  
This paper is not the first to suggest that this is insufficient, and to call for change.95  By 
recognising a legitimate property right in the corpse, as opposed to a diluted entitlement 
to possession, our law would be providing for numerous alternative options for redress in 
situations where the burial process, or the remains themselves, are interfered with.  A 
claimant could therefore enforce their right through the criminal law or through civil 
avenues such as the tort of conversion.  It is unlikely that there will be many cases in 
  
94  As per Burial and Cremation Act 1964, s 51. 
95  See inter alia Peter Skegg, above n 89, at 417–418 and Remigius N. Nwabueze Biotechnology and the 
Challenge of Property (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 2007) at 225. 
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which these measures will be utilised, but it is this author's view that the recognition of a 
property right will have a significant impact on the perception of individuals' roles in the 
decision-making process.  A property right is the strongest protection our law provides, 
thus it would offer certainty and afford the appropriate level of importance on the right-
holder's duty. 
 
It is this author's view that the body of a deceased loved one is exactly the kind of object 
we ought to be protecting with a property right.  In other areas of the law, when assessing 
a plaintiff's loss in a dispute, the court will quite frequently take into consideration the 
plaintiff's idiosyncratic value of the thing lost when assessing the appropriate remedy.  A 
proprietary remedy will be considered necessary if a personal liability remedy does not 
sufficiently recover the plaintiff's damage.96  That is, if the subject matter is of too great a 
value so as to render a compensatory award ineffective, a property analysis will kick in to 
protect the claimant's interest.  This logic is most commonly applied to disputes over 
land, as land is often considered to be the kind of thing to which people attach particular 
meaning and significance.  Following this rationale the body of a loved one arguably 
satisfies the proprietary analysis perfectly.  Arguably there are no stronger connections 
than those between loved ones, and never are they felt more strongly than in the period 
after a death. 
C A Property Right Vested in the Next of kin 
Perhaps the key difference between this paper and other pieces in support of a framework 
for property rights in the dead97 is the view that the right should vest in the next of kin 
and not the executor.98  As is outlined above, the quasi-property right when first 
conceived by the American authorities highlighted the next of kin as the one in whom the 
rights must vest.99  The reason being that it was the family of the deceased who were 
considered the most practical decision-makers.  In Takamore v Clarke both Elias CJ and 
McGrath J make note that the reality of burial and funeral rites is that they are primarily 
matters for family and friends.100  The law should reflect this.  There is, in fact, some 
indication from the statute law that family members are indeed considered to be the 
relevant subjects for control of the body.  
 
  
96  Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Limited [2012] NZSC 11 (5 March 2012). 
97  See in particular the excellent thesis from Cordelia Thomas, above n 35.  
98  Support for this view is advanced by Nicola Peart, above n 3, at 126. 
99  Renihan v Wright, above n 23, at 542. 
100  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [2] per Elias CJ and [117] per McGrath, Tipping and Blanchard JJ. 
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Both the Coroners Act 2006 and the Human Tissue Act 2008 deal comprehensively with 
the storage, collection and use of the human body or body parts after death.  The 
Coroners Act has numerous provisions, which refer to the rights of family members of 
the deceased.  However it does not mention any entitlement on behalf of the executor.101  
Similarly the Human Tissue Act, which specifically covers consent requirements for the 
use of body parts for therapeutic purposes, refers to obtaining consent from the deceased's 
family, not an executor.102  The Maritime Transport Act 1994 provides at s 25: 
25. Body and effects of deceased seafarer –  
(1) Subject to subsection (2), every employer of seafarers on a New Zealand ship 
shall make suitable arrangements for the body and effects of any seafarer who dies in 
the course of a voyage, which may include the return of the body to the deceased's 
next of kin or the burial or cremation of that body. 
(2) The employer shall endeavour to ascertain the reasonable wishes of the 
deceased's next of kin and shall, where practicable, comply with those wishes. 
This section is interesting as it exemplifies that the expected position in New Zealand is 
to have the body returned to the family, and for the family's wishes to be given 
preference.  These provisions seems entirely logical and in accordance with common 
practice.  That said, it begs the question as to why there would ever be cause to advocate 
for the executor holding the property right?  
 
As is argued throughout the case law and commentary, the motivation for the executor to 
have the final say is two-fold.  Firstly the executor represents the deceased's wishes and 
can therefore best ensure their intention is made out, and secondly the executor, if a 
character removed from the family circle, can afford neutrality in the case of disputes.  
With respect, this author considers neither of these factors to be desirable in the New 
Zealand context.   
1 Subordination of the Deceased's Wishes 
It is good law, long established that the deceased's wishes as to burial are 
unenforceable.103  However both the core judgements from Takamore v Clarke 
considered the deceased's wishes to be influential considerations on the final decision.  
Elias CJ arguably imported a decision she hypothesised would have been made by the 
deceased had he left a will.104  Additionally there has been a trend recently in cases of this 
  
101  See Coroners Act 2006, ss 18–56. 
102  Human Tissue Act 2008, s 12. 
103  This is a proposition clearly authorised by Williams v Williams, above n 17, at 665. 
104  Based on his choices during his lifetime.  
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nature, to discuss Article 8105 rights to a private, family life as applying to a person even 
after life.106  This author disagrees with any subordination of the family's interests in 
favour of the deceased.  As Thomas Mann says "[i]t is a fact that a man’s dying is more 
the survivors’ affair than his own."107  If a particular family wishes to honour the provisos 
left by their loved one then that is their prerogative, but the law need not and ought not to 
step in and give a voice to the dead in this regard.   
 
The primacy of the living over the dead is an incredibly important stance in New Zealand 
given the need for our laws to be inclusive of tikanga Māori.  A guidance paper prepared 
by the Mauri Ora Associates for the New Zealand Medical Council is of great assistance 
in conveying the Māori approach to death and grieving (governed by the concept of 
tangihanga).  It is outlined that108 
The Māori view of dying and death is quite different from the non-Māori view, as is 
the Māori way of grieving for the dead. In Māori culture, the past is considered ‘in 
front of’ us because we know about it, understand it, and our current actions are 
based upon it, while the future cannot be seen and is thus considered ‘behind’ us. 
Incorporated in this is the belief that "the dead are the basis of one’s very existence in the 
present and are an important part of current life."109  Significant importance is therefore 
placed on the traditions and rituals of the funeral; tangihanga are crucial and very 
complex.110  The late Dr Paratene Ngata spoke at length of the importance of Māori 
funeral customs (tangihanga) to Māori.111  For our purposes what is perhaps the most 
crucial aspect of Māori grieving rites is the emphasis on a communal forum in which to 
grieve.112   
 
In an interview documenting how his own whānau commiserated the death of a loved 
one, Dr Ngata noted that the whole process was a cooperative affair with the sons of the 
  
105  European Convention on Human Rights ETS No 005 (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 
September 1953), art 8. 
106  See the discussion in Takamore v Clarke, above n 47, at [226]–[229] per Glazebrook and Wild JJ. 
107  As quoted in Heather Conway "Dead, But Not Buried: Bodies, Burial and Family Conflicts" (2003) 
23 LS 423. 
108  B Packal and P Jansen Best Health Outcomes for Māori (Medical Council of New Zealand, 
Wellington, 2006) at 27. Note that Dr Paratene Ngata and Mason Durie were also contributing 
authors to this report. 
109  At 27. 
110  At 27. 
111  (23 October 2007) 643 HTB 12607 per Tariana Turia, citing Dr Paratene Ngata in the New Zealand 
Medical Law Journal, 1995. 
112  Lucy Middleton "The Writer Who Buried his Father the Māori Way" The New Scientist (online ed, 
London, 13 October 2007) at 52. 
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deceased making the coffin and other family members consecrating the cadaver.113  The 
setting for the tangi was the communal marae where all friends and family gathered for a 
significant period so as to share their grief.  Dr Ngata explained "[t]ears and grief were 
expressed openly, everyone sharing in the pain, as is the Māori way."114  It is interesting 
that Dr Ngata then added; "I think it's because death is so inclusive and expressive that 
we see little, if any, grief-related depressive illness among Māoris."115  In order for this 
communal process to be a possibility the deceased's wishes have to be subrogated for the 
collective interest of the whānau and hapū.  Thus the deceased's kin and not an executor, 
acting on a fiduciary duty to the deceased, needs to be given full control of the process.  
This stance is important in a broader sense to Māori because the collective interest is 
given priority over individuals generally as a matter of tikanga.116 
2 The Executor as a Dispute Resolver 
The second argument suggested as a motivator for vesting rights in an executor is that 
they will be able to act as a mediator in the case of a dispute.  This author does not see 
this as an appropriate view of reality.  Most commonly an executor will be either a person 
closely connected with the deceased or a person removed from the family unit but with 
the appropriate expertise for dealing with wills.  If the former then the neutrality 
argument is dead on arrival, or at best a complex case of dual roles, overlaid with a 
conflict of interest.  This author does not find this argument convincing, particularly 
considering it depends on the premise that the executor will be able to isolate his or her 
own emotions at a time of grief and vulnerability.   
 
If, on the other hand, the executor is an individual removed from the family then 
neutrality of opinion does appear possible.  However it is this author's opinion that this is 
not in fact desirable.  Heather Conway outlines the potential for families to be entirely 
isolated from the decision-making process where the executor is involved.117  If the 
executor has been appointed by way of their position as the deceased's lawyer (for 
example) and not as a result of a connection to the whānau, there is a further danger for 
  
113  Lucy Middleton, above n 112. 
114  Above n 112. 
115  Above n 112.  The author did not find this area particularly well documented.  However specific 
mention has been made that unresolved grief will have an increased affect on Māori in terms of 
causing depressive disorders, than on non-Māori.  This supports the emphasis Dr Ngata places on the 
"Māori way". See National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability Guidelines for the 
Treatment and Management of Depression by Primary Healthcare Professionals (National Advisory 
Committee on Health and Disability, September 1996) at 27. 
116  See the relevant discussion from Tariana Turia in the House at (23 October 2007) 643 HTB 12607. 
117  Heather Conway "Dead, But Not Buried: Bodies, Burial and Family Conflicts" (2003) 23 LS 423 at 
435–436. 
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Māori.  Namely, the executor may be entirely devoid of sufficient knowledge of the hapū 
or of tikanga in general.  This could potentially cause irreparable damage by hindering 
the grieving process.  
D The Inevitable Disputes 
The above discussion would be incomplete without the following caveat.  As Elias CJ 
pointed out, any true measure of certainty in this area is likely to prove illusory over 
time.118  Thus this author predicts that there will undoubtedly be challenges in the future 
as to the validity of the property right.  It is likely that those challenges will take root in 
claims as to who is the rightful 'next of kin'.  It is expected that the rules as applied in 
positions of intestacy will be extended to cover the body of the deceased, as they do the 
assets belonging to the estate.  Thus, as has been mentioned earlier there will be 
occasions where the deceased's body will vest collectively in a number of family 
members; most commonly, in the parents of a deceased child or the children of a 
deceased parent.119  This author does not consider that this will often be a problem.  In the 
large majority of cases a shared right will serve to encourage discussion and cooperation 
with regard to the decisions to be made, conflict will be ameliorated by the shared desire 
to respect the dead.  However when disputes do arise among equal rights holders it is this 
author's view that a 'majority rule' approach be adopted, with the proviso that the solution 
reached is reasonable and that no mutually acceptable solution was possible.   
1 Is a Mutually Suitable Option Available? 
The above approach is largely construed from the case law considered by Nicola Peart of 
the New Zealand Law Society.120  Firstly, in Fessi v Whitmore121 Boggis QC (sitting in 
the Chancery Division) considered a dispute between the divorced parents of a deceased 
12 year old.  After the separation the boy had been in father's care in Borth, but had spent 
most of his life in Nuneaton where his mother was still lived.  Each parent wished for the 
ashes of their son to be interred near them.  Boggis QC considered that when faced with a 
decision of this kind "one takes all of the background into account. One takes into 
account the views held on both sides and comes to a conclusion which does fairness to 
both sides."122  The decision that accorded with fairness in that situation was to adopt the 
mother's preference.  This was justified as Mr Whitmore's father's ashes had been 
scattered in Nuneaton and thus it was a place regularly visited by Mr Whitmore and his 
  
118  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [66]. 
119  High Court Rules, r 27.35(3). 
120  Nicola Peart, above n 3, at 126–127. 
121  Fessi v Whitmore [1999] FLR 767. 
122  At [770]. 
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family.  Boggis QC found a solution arguably amenable to both sides.  It is appropriate 
for this approach to be the court's starting point in resolving disputes of this kind.   
2 The Right-holder's Intentions Ought not be Unreasonable: 
The English case of Hartstone v Gardner123 dealt with a similar set of facts to Fessi v 
Whitmore, and the High Court took a similar approach.  However, notably the Court 
found that the most overarching consideration is that the body must be buried in 
accordance with public decency and as expediently as possible.124  Thus a family 
member's wishes could be discounted if they unreasonably impede expedient burial.  As 
has been established, this author concedes limits on the next of kin's right for this end.  
However the Court went on to quote the case of Calma v Sesar125 where practical 
considerations were deemed fatal to the family's wishes.  There the Supreme Court of the 
Northern Territory had ruled that there was no good reason to fly a corpse thousands of 
miles for a funeral.  It is this author's opinion that practical considerations of this kind 
have very little, if any, relevance.  Thus there ought to be a line drawn between wishes 
that will impede expedient burial and jeopardises health and safety and wishes that may 
seem 'impractical'.  Arguably practical concerns are outweighed by the immeasurably 
more important consideration that the family ought to be able to grieve sufficiently.  
3 Majority Rule 
In the spirit of collective decision-making unanimity is of course the ideal, but in the truly 
difficult cases a majority opinion is suitable.  In Leeburn v Derndorfer and Plunkett126 the 
Supreme Court of Victoria dealt with a conflict between the three children of a deceased 
who were all executors.  The siblings were agreed on cremation, but whereas Leeburn 
was happy to split the ashes in three parts so as to please everyone, his sisters were 
disgusted by the idea of splitting the ashes.  The sisters went ahead with their plan to bury 
the ashes all together in a local cemetery plot. Leeburn was not informed.  Leeburn 
contended that his sisters' actions were void by way of not being unanimous.  This 
argument was reasonably rejected.  However, the Court held "[g]enerally speaking, the 
act of any one of multiple executors with respect to estate property will bind the 
estate."127  This is an unhelpful stance, as it would undermine the opportunity for 
collective decision-making that multiple right-holders allows for.  Byrne J did however 
seem swayed by other factors live in that case.  In particular, his Honour commented that 
  
123  Hartstone v Gardner [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch). 
124  At [9]. 
125  Calma v Sesar (1992) 2 NTLR 37. 
126  Leeburn v Derndorfer and Plunkett [2004] VSC 172.  
127  At [15]. 
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he could not "ignore the fact that the majority of the executors have selected this 
location."128  In the author's opinion this is indeed a persuasive consideration.  Thus this 
paper calls for a majority decision at least.   
4 Obligation of Consultation 
The above compromises will not be possible without collective consultation among all 
right-holders.  This paper advocates that an obligation of consultation on the right-
holder(s) is of utmost importance.  As has been established, a property right is a 
considerable protection to afford the next of kin, thus a correlative obligation to consult 
other interested parties seems appropriate.  Arguably, the truth of this is exemplified by 
the Takamore v Clarke decision.  All of the judges noted the importance of valid 
consideration of the cultural needs of the Kutarere family.129  As William Young J 
concluded Māori custom ought to have been the decisive consideration in that case.130  
Māori commentators have also stressed that consultation with whānau and extended 
whānau is crucial in these matters.131  To reiterate, McGrath J considered that the 
personal representative ought to consult the extended whānau but that this would not be a 
mandatory obligation of fulfilling the duty.132  The reason being that it was predicted that 
the obligation would be impractical in certain circumstances.  This author rejects this 
view.  More correctly it will be impractical not to consult, when the alternative is to 
isolate interested parties and incite objections.  Moreover the obligation need not be 
onerous, especially considering any interested parties are likely to be available during the 
grieving process and therefore available for consultation also.  It is this author's opinion 
that an obligation for consultation could remove the incentive for drastic action such as 
the Takamore dispute, as all interested parties will comprehend their role in the process, 
removing the fear of being ignored.  
 
VI The Doodeward Exception Applied 
 
By far the closest the common law world has come to recognising a property right in the 
human body is the development of the Doodeward exception.  As discussed above, courts 
have been more amenable to finding the body capable of being the object of property 
rights once it has been transformed in some way through the use of skill and labour.  This 
  
128  At [32]. 
129  Takamore v Clarke, above n 2, at [81] per Elias CJ, at [156] per McGrath, Tipping and Blanchard JJ 
and at [213] per William Young J. 
130  At [213]. 
131  See (23 October 2007) 643 HTB 12607 per Tariana Turia, citing Dr Paratene Ngata. 
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thesis does not depend on a development of the Doodeward principle to justify the 
vesting of property rights in the next of kin.  However it is important to consider the 
effect of the Doodeward exception on the property right, as it would stand.  The most 
controversial and interesting aspects of this challenge regard the retention of body parts 
from cadavers to be used in medical research, and the treatment of specimens as museum 
exhibits. 
A Case Study: The Gravatt Family 
The prospect of losing a child is undoubtedly every parent's worst nightmare and when 
Lance and Jenny Gravatt's son Zachary contracted meningococcal C virus in July 2009 
their darkest fears became a reality.  To add insult to injury the Gravatts had to wait 
almost four years before they could properly lay Zac, 22, to rest.  The reason being that 
following the post-mortem the pathologist had withheld several samples of Zac's bodily 
tissue, including sections of his heart, lungs, kidneys and brain.133  The Gravatts were 
never consulted as to this decision and did not discover the truth until Dr Gravatt 
examined his son's autopsy report many months after Zac's funeral.  The Gravatts 
appealed to the pathologist and were able to receive the remains from the coroner.  A 
second memorial was held so that friends and family could say goodbye to Zac for good.  
At this point the Gravatts were scandalised to learn that the pathologist had once again 
retained samples of Zac's bodily tissue, apparently in the name of medical research.  
Again the Gravatts appealed to the coroner and again they had to endure the sterile 
procedure of picking up Zac's remains from the local District Court.  Dr Gravatt has 
spoken publicly of the anguish this "harrowing" ordeal caused his family.134  The Gravatt 
family ordeal fits nicely into this discussion paper as it reiterates the need families have to 
grieve in ways suitable for them, and the consequent pain that can ensue when these 
processes are interfered with.  Thus the example provides further support for the 
existence of a proprietary remedy. 
B Background 
1 The Green Lane Hospital Scandal 
The retention of body parts without the consent of family members is not a new 
controversy.  In the early 2000s parents of children that had died at Green Lane Hospital 
  
133  Martin Johnston "Grieving couple made to fight for son's body parts" (11 April 2013) The New 
Zealand Herald  
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/health/news/article.cfm?c_id=204&objectid=10876791>. 
134  Martin Johnston, above.  See also (including the comment section) Jeremy Olds "Auckland DHB 
settles over Gravatt death" (27 June 2013) nzDoctor.co.nz 
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in Auckland discovered that the hospital had been storing the infant hearts for research 
purposes.135  This practice dated back to the 1950s and in 2002 the hospital had some 
1350 hearts.136  Some of the organs had been obtained with the consent of the families, 
however the large majority were covertly detained.137  The true controversy crystallised 
with regard to organs taken from 1990 onwards as previously there had been no 
obligation to seek consent.  The Cartwright Report of 1988138 however, had ensured that 
the importance of informed consent was undeniably clear.139  Thus the Green Lane 
scandal enthralled and enraged many, causing 43 parents to bring suits against the 
hospital.  The litigation was later settled privately on confidential terms.  Importantly 
though it sparked a second consideration of the requirements for informed consent in 
medical practice, specifically with reference to the treatment of cadavers. 
2 Human Tissue Act 2008 (HTA) 
The Human Tissue Bill was introduced in Parliament in 2006 in order to:140 
address concerns … including a lack of clarity around the informed consent 
requirements for the collection and retention of tissue; the role of family members in 
giving consent for the collection and use of tissue from a person who has died, and 
the lack of individual autonomy in the area. 
Thus one of the key themes of the Act is the importance of obtaining informed consent 
from the family of the deceased.  The Act also expressly notes that consideration must be 
given to the families' cultural or spiritual beliefs.141  Importantly for the purpose of this 
discussion, informed consent is not needed for some specified purposes:142 
a) the exercise by a person of that person’s powers under any law to collect or use 
tissue without consent, including (without limitation) powers of that kind exercised 
for either of the following purposes: 
  
135  TVNZ "Organ scandal spreads to NZ" (27 February 2002) TVNZ News 
<http://tvnz.co.nz/content/84067/425826/article.html>. 
136  NZ Herald "Hospitals legally entitled to keep hearts, says expert" (28 February 2002) The New 
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Society of New Zealand – science in the news <http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/2002/03/07/health-
heart-150/> 
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(i) the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, detection, investigation, 
prosecution, or punishment of offences; or 
(ii) the protection of the health or safety of members of the public: 
(d) the performance of a post-mortem of a body that one of the following competent 
legal authorities has, under one of the following enactments, directed or ordered to 
be performed: 
(i) a coroner acting under section 31 of the Coroners Act 2006; and 
(ii) the High Court acting under section 41 of the Coroners Act 2006… 
However, given the emphasis the Act affords to the family of the deceased it is likely this 
section is viewed as a situation where public policy justifies implying consent; as 
opposed to a situation where the family's right can be ignored.  As has been mentioned 
above, such contravention of the next of kin's right is considered reasonable.   
 
Outside of the protection of s 20, the legislation is clear that informed consent must be 
given in order for the use of body parts to be lawful.143  These provisions accord with the 
proposal to vest a property right in the next of kin and it is conceivable that continuation 
of these practices could be viewed as a bailment or trust relationship.  However what is 
shown by situations like the Gravatt's is that there is still some confusion under the 
current scheme as to a pathologist's obligation to keep the family or next of kin involved 
and informed.  It is this author's view that the creation of a property right will remove 
such confusion, as it would solidify the parameters of the medical professional's liberties.  
 
The interesting legal question that must be resolved is of course the effect of the 
Doodeward exception on the rights of families.  Namely, if a medical professional were 
to transform a body part, previously under the family's control, would that body part vest 
instead in the medical professional?  Considering the question of Zac Gravatt's remains, 
ought the pathologist's actions justify the recognition of a property right in favour of the 
pathologist, to the detriment of Zac's parents?  As is evident given the underlying policy 
perspective of this paper, the proposed answer is: no.  Alternately, and arguably more 
simply, the property right vested in the Gravatt's ought to render the pathologist's actions 
an unlawful interference. 
C Relevant Case Law Developments 
The basic propositions handed down in the Doodeward case are outlined above.  
However for the purposes of this specific inquiry it is useful to also examine the case of 
Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority.144  That case involved a patient who had died 
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of a brain tumour that went undetected by medical professionals.  An autopsy was 
therefore crucial and the deceased's brain was removed and preserved for the purposes of 
the autopsy.  Three years after the funeral the deceased's family attempted to get the brain 
returned to them, however it had been destroyed.  A claim was then brought in negligence 
alleging a failure to ensure the safe storage of the organ.  When considering the 
Doodeward exception Peter Gibson LJ was critical of its legitimacy145 and furthermore 
went on to distinguish Doodeward from the facts of the matter at hand.  It was held that 
the pathologist's actions of removing the brain and storing it in paraffin for the purposes 
of deducing a cause of death was not:146 
on a par with … preserving an anatomical or pathological specimen for a scientific 
collection or with preserving a human freak such as a double-headed foetus that had 
some value for exhibition purposes. 
From this decision, the arbitrariness of the Doodeward principle is immediately clear.  In 
terms of what constitutes a relevant transformation there seems very little difference 
between preserving a foetus in paraffin for amusement and preserving a brain for the 
purposes of continued research and yet Peter Gibson LJ considered the difference to be 
material.  It has been suggested the real motivation for the Court in Dobson v North 
Tyneside Health Authority was a reluctance to develop a precedent that held hospitals 
responsible for the safekeeping of body parts on the off chance family members would 
make claims in the future.147  This practical consideration does seem more convincing. 
 
Peter Gibson LJ went on to explain that there was no practical reason why the brain ought 
to have been kept, as there was no "sensible" reason to reunite it with the buried corpse148 
and thus its disposal was at the will of the coroner.  Perhaps from this comment, it is 
possible to conclude the principal requirement of the Doodeward test is that the 
transformation must have succeeded in transforming the body part into a thing, which has 
an inherent value aside from its meaning to the deceased's family.  This is of course 
taking wild liberties with Peter Gibson LJ's judgment.  This view of the Doodeward test 
does have some minor judicial support in the obiter dictum of Rose LJ in R v Kelly; R v 
Lindsay.149  However, even if this was to form the Doodeward test it is still questionable 
whether the slides produced by the pathologist in the Gravatt case would qualify.  There 
is the factual difficulty as to how much transformation has actually occurred in the 
process of slicing and storing the materials, but moreover there is a conceptual difficulty 
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as to the worth of the samples.  It is accepted that pathologists obtain and retain such 
material in the hopes that it will prove useful in research, but would this hypothetical 
value be enough?  This difficulty in applying the Doodeward exception led Peter Skegg 
to deem it unworkable.150 
 
There is however a very limited number of recent cases that shed light on this question.  
In Roche v Douglas151 Master Sanderson quoted with approval a passage from Palmer 
and McKendrick, which speaks favourably of the recognition of a property right in body 
parts.152  That case involved a Perth woman's claim over her father's estate.  The trouble 
for Ms Roche was that her paternity had never been proven.  The man in question had 
had tissue removed during surgery, which had been preserved in paraffin wax by a 
pathology laboratory, and thus Ms Roche applied for a court order requiring the tissue to 
be tested.  A successful application relied on the Master of the Supreme Court electing to 
exercise his discretion to grant an access order to 'property' for the purposes of a paternity 
test.  Thus the case became one about the nature of the tissue samples, and whether they 
could be deemed property.  Master Sanderson's ultimate decision to grant Ms Roche's 
order was a very clear recognition of the existence of property rights in body parts.153   
it defies reason to not regard tissue samples as property … To deny that the tissue 
samples are property, in contrast to the paraffin in which the samples are kept or the 
jar in which both the paraffin and the samples are stored, would be in my view to 
create a legal fiction.  There is no rational or logical justification for such a result. 
 
What is particularly interesting then is that Master Sanderson's judgement was essentially 
a rejection of the Doodeward test.  In spite of the facts of the case lending themselves to 
an adoption of Griffith J's findings, Master Sanderson concluded that the tissue sample 
was property by its very nature, not by virtue of ‘work’ done on it and he ordered that the 
test be done.154  Fortunately, owing to its unusual facts, this case is directly analogous to 
the present inquiry.  Thus Roche v Douglas, while merely being a preliminary judgment, 
is a good indicator of the degree to which Doodeward is likely to be relevant to the 
current issue.   
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A contrasting view is available on examination of the English High Court case AB v 
Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust.155  This case involved similar facts to that of the 
Green Lane scandal.  The claimants in the group action were all parents whose children 
had died and been the subjects of post mortems carried out by the defendant.  The 
claimants alleged that, although they had consented to the post mortems, the organs of the 
children had been removed, retained and subsequently disposed of without their 
knowledge and consent.156  The claimants brought claims against the defendant seeking 
damages in tort-based actions as a result of the Hospital's interference with their 
children's organs.  Gage J had no difficulty applying the Doodeward test to the case 
before him, holding that the organs stored by the defendants were capable of being the 
objects of property rights.  The pathologists' work and skill applied to the removal of 
body parts was sufficient to move the organs into the Doodeward category.157  Gage J 
was unequivocal in his finding that the Doodeward exception was, in fact, good law.158   
 
In the context of the other authorities on this point though, Gage J's comments serve only 
to make this area more equivocal.  It is this author's view that the balance of the case law 
comes down on the side of rejecting a Doodeward property right in specimens such as 
those extracted from Zac Gravatt.  However, even if the samples were considered to have 
been relevantly transformed by the pathologist so as to confer a property right on him, 
this paper advocates for the subordination of that right, in favour of the next of kin's 
claim.  This view would accord with general principles of property law; the pathologist 
could not gain a better right than the Gravatt's unless and until they divested themselves 
of their primary claim.   
D The Tikanga Māori Influence (Again) 
Once again, consideration of tikanga serves to highlight the potential dangers of failing to 
prefer the family interest, and subsequently the potential benefits of protecting the 
whānau interest.  Speaking during the second reading of the Human Tissue Bill, in 2007, 
Tariana Turia quoted Māori tikanga expert and Doctor, Paratene Ngata.  Ngata explained 
that for Māori:159  
Death and dying, like giving birth and living, are considered natural and normal 
processes like breathing, eating, sleeping and creating life. Death is also a 
  
155  AB v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2004] EWHC 644. 
156  At [12]. 
157  At [148] and [160]. 
158   At [148]. 
159  (23 October 2007) 643 HTB 12607. 
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transitional process—from Te Ao Marama (the world of light) to Te Ao Pouri (the 
world of darkness), a normal part of the life cycle … And while contemporary Māori 
attitudes and beliefs have been significantly influenced by the Christian doctrine, any 
attempt to intervene in any natural and biological process—like Tane’s struggle to 
conquer death—would generally meet with antagonism, disapproval and vigorous 
opposition. 
The relevance of citing this phrase of Ngata's here was to enable Turia to convey the 
cultural significance of parting with pieces of one's person.160   
 
In her extensive thesis on the topic of property in the body, Cordelia Thomas documents 
the Māori worldview with comprehensive discussion.161  Thomas notes that there are 
numerous tikanga concepts that must be given consideration when discussing issues such 
as the retention of human tissue.  Both Whakapapa and Kaitiakitanga are crucial to 
understanding the Māori perspective.  Whakapapa, meaning both genealogy and the act 
of making a genealogical connection, is viewed as the linking tool in Māori society, 
ensuring the continuity of the Māori collective unit.162  For Māori these bonds extend to 
connect people with the land and thus reuniting a person with the land upon death is a 
vital aspect of ensuring continuity of relationships.163  The retention of certain body parts, 
however small, without the consent and acknowledgement of the whānau may have 
disastrous affects on the whakapapa of the individual and the group.  Kaitiakitanga 
loosely translates to the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an area in 
accordance with tikanga.164  With relation to dealing with bodies after death, 
Kaitiakitanga reiterates the importance of non-interference with multigenerational 
whakapapa.  "There is an obligation on individuals to assume responsibility [for] … the 
cultural imperative that human remains must be returned to their place of origin and 
buried."165  Thomas expressly conveys the fear that retention of human tissue may 
unsettle and interfere with these customs.  "Storage and eventual repatriation are ethical 
issues as significant to Māori as collection and usage,"166 and thus the storage of human 
materials is culturally unacceptable.167 
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The above discussion emphasises the potential for continued injury of the kind 
experienced by the Gravatts.  The most effective way of minimising the danger of harm is 
to recognise a property right in the corpse, vested in the next of kin from the moment of 
passing.  A pathologist, or other medical professional, will therefore be limited in their 
interaction with the corpse to the degree stipulated in the relevant legislation.  A property 
right carries with it a certain universal clout that will arguably alter the perception of 
those medical professionals who continue to ignore the wishes of the families affected.  
The Māori Party voted down the Human Tissue Bill, as it provided for the deceased's 
view to trump any objections of the whānau.168  Thus tikanga confirms that the living 
family members are the desired decision-makers.  "The processes around the collection or 
use of human tissue … have always [sic] seen as being in the realm of whānau, hapū, and 
iwi decision-making."169   
E Public Display: a Place for Museum Exhibits? 
The final section of this discussion is not extensive, as the law regarding museum exhibits 
is far less controversial than the aforementioned issues.  However, for completeness it is 
necessary to discuss the second component of the Doodeward exception, namely the 
recognition of a property right in a corpse for the purposes of public display.  Again, this 
right would require some relevant transformation of the body or part of the body, to have 
occurred through the use of skill and labour. 
1 Toi Moko 
Toi Moko are a useful example of this issue arising in modern times; helpfully germane 
to New Zealand.  Toi Moko, Māori tattooed, preserved human heads have a significant 
and surprisingly poignant place in our history.170   
The head of the old-time Maori chief was regarded as a valuable possession whether 
on or off his shoulders. In pre-pakeha days, when Might was Right and the Maori 
made inter-  tribal war, it was the custom, when possible, for his warriors to secure 
the heads of their chiefs and other noted men who fell in battle. 
When the heads were taken back to the victor's homelands they would be preserved and 
placed on staffs at the boundary of the marae so as to exemplify the mana of that iwi in 
their success.  Heads of relatives and friends were also considered of great value and it 
was a gallant act, well regarded, to retain the head of a loved one from the enemy.171  
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Upon the arrival of the white man a trade in Toi Moko emerged.172  As Māori realised the 
worth of Toi Moko the tradition as to 'head accumulation' developed.  That is, slaves 
would be tattooed in the same manner as a chief and then decapitated so as to make a 
(faux) Toi Moko.173  From early on there was an attraction in the tattooed heads across 
European museums; the trade became particularly competitive.174   
 
What is evident from the outset is that Toi Moko would easily satisfy the Doodeward 
requirement of transformation.  The process of full facial tattooing and herbal 
preservation was considerably skilled.  This is exemplified most obviously by the 
significant number of Toi Moko as of yet not decomposed.  In addition Peter Skegg has 
mentioned specifically his view that heads of the Toi Moko kind are protected by 
Doodeward.175  Thus this alternative analysis would support the recognition of a property 
right.  With regard to specimens used in public display, it is likely that there will be less 
difficulty in applying the Doodeward exception.  That is owing to the specific mention of 
the use of body parts for public display, in Griffith J's judgment:176  
It is idle to contend in these days that the possession of a mummy, or of a prepared 
skeleton, or of a skull, or other parts of a human body, is necessarily unlawful; if it 
is, the many valuable collections of anatomical and pathological specimens or 
preparations formed and maintained by scientific bodies, were formed and are 
maintained in violation of the law. 
Even Higgins J, in dissent, seemed amenable to the notion that specimens in museums for 
public exhibition exist outside of the common law general rule.  Higgins J noted; "it is 
urged that there must be property in a mummy. The point has not been tested, I believe, 
in British Courts; but I assume that there can be property."177 
 
The difficulty with applying the Doodeward test and outcome to specimens such as Toi 
Moko is in deciding whom the interest would vest in.  There is no doubt that in theory the 
property right is awarded to him who utilised the skill and labour in the original 
transformation.  However, with the likes of Toi Moko, and the same is probably true of 
the majority of human remains exhibited, that person is unlikely to be identified.  
Moreover even if a valid chain of succession could be produced to the original hapū who 
claims responsibility, there are pressing issues of whether the original owners' interests 
  
172  The first recorded instance of the sale of a Maori preserved head was  made on the 20th January 
1770, to Joseph Banks, one of  the scientists with the Exploring Expedition of Captain  Cook, see 
Thomas Edward Doone, above n 170, at 150. 
173  At 151. 
174  At 150. 
175  Peter Skegg, above n 89, at 419. 
176  Doodeward v Spence, above n 38, at 413. 
177  At 422. 
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have been legitimately dispensed of over time.178  Namely, through sale to European 
traders, at a time predating the prohibition on trade.  The difficulty here is naturally 
exacerbated by the international context in which debates over possession are likely to 
play out.  
 
This contention has been directly exemplified with regard to the treatment of Toi Moko 
in French museums and under French law.  Earlier this century Te Papa Tongarewa, New 
Zealand's National Museum commenced efforts to track down Toi Moko still exhibited in 
museums overseas and bring them home to New Zealand.179  In France this effort met 
with direct resistance and the matter came before an administrative tribunal.180  In 2007 
the mayor of the French city of Rouen had agreed with Te Papa staff that the Toi Moko, 
then held in Rouen's Museum of Natural History, would be returned.  However before 
this agreement could be effected the French Minister of Culture intervened, enforcing a 
French law that deemed items belonging to a French museum collection to be in the 
public domain, and therefore inalienable.181  Thus, the New Zealand Government's claim 
to possession was entirely rejected.  The legal question was framed thus; "[i]s the head a 
French public good that must be declassified before it can be returned, or is it a body part 
(and not a work of art) that can be immediately returned in order to be properly 
buried?"182  Thus this raises the potential for the New Zealand Government to protect 
these specimens by denying an application of the Doodeward principle, and advocating 
instead for the recognition of the next of kin's right to proper burial. 
 
Fortunately for those interested parties at home, this decision was later overruled by 
French legislation, specifically facilitating the return of Toi Moko.183  The effect of this 
  
178  As the discussion of ownership of three Toi Moko in Wayne Orchiston Preserved Māori Heads in the 
Australian Museum Dominion Museum, Wellington, 1970) shows, this is a considerably difficult 
question to answer. 
179  "As a result of this and earlier initiatives, nearly 360 Maori ancestral remains (including Toi Moko) 
have been returned to New Zealand since 1987. Returns have occurred from some 13 foreign 
countries and 55 different institutions. Te Papa currently holds approximately 85 Toi Moko. It has 
been suggested that there are possibly at least the same number of Toi Moko still remaining in 
institutional collections outside New Zealand, and repatriation efforts continue." See Robert K 
Paterson “Heading Home: French Law Enables Return of Maori Heads to New Zealand” (2010) 17 
Intl J Cult Prop at 643. 
180  See Robert K Paterson “Administrative Tribunal of Rouen Decision (Maori Head case)” (2008) 15 
Intl J Cult Prop at 223, and Robert K Paterson “Heading Home: French Law Enables Return of Maori 
Heads to New Zealand” (2010) 17 Intl J Cult Prop at 643. 
181  Robert K Paterson “Administrative Tribunal of Rouen Decision (Maori Head case)” (2008) 15 Intl J 
Cult Prop at 223. 
182  Above n 181. 
183  Loi No. 2010-501 du 18 mai 2010 visant à autoriser la restitution par la France des têtes maories à la 
Nouvelle-Zélande et relative à la gestion des collections.  See Robert K Paterson “Heading Home: 
French Law Enables Return of Maori Heads to New Zealand” (2010) 17 Intl J Cult Prop at 643. 
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law was to bring the Toi Moko outside of the principle of inalienability applicable to 
French publically owned exhibits.  Robert K Paterson has concluded that the decisions of 
the Administrative Tribunal (and later of the Administrative Court of Appeal, which 
confirmed the Tribunal's decision) were the result of a reluctance to conclude on the 
controversial question of the ambit of the 'no property in the body' general rule.184  This is 
understandable given the nuances of the legal discussion internationally.  Instead, by 
enacting special legislation the French Government characterised the tone of negotiations.  
In terms of engagement with domestic legal principles, requests for the return of 
specimens held in museums have been conducted in a rather informal way.185  Without 
really acknowledging any proprietary interest in the Toi Moko the New Zealand 
Government has managed to secure international recognition of our inherent right to 
repatriation.  It appears as though this view is developing as a kind of international 
custom, driven both by a modern conception of state entitlements and historical redress, 
and a general preference for cooperation.  Conceptually this example adds little to the 
debate on property rights in a corpse, but of particular interest is the general perception 
that the Doodeward exception is unnecessary.   
 
By considering the way in which the New Zealand Government has reacted towards Toi 
Moko domestically, it is possible to make two judgments in support of the proposed 
framework for a property right in the next of kin.  Firstly, the motivation for the 
repatriation efforts has been to reunite the Toi Moko with the iwi to whom the person 
belonged in life.186  This indicates, primarily, that the relevant right involved is that of the 
iwi with whom responsibility lies to ensure proper burial.  This right appears to now be 
valued higher than any claim from museums in New Zealand; the option for Te Papa to 
retain the Toi Moko is discussed only as a temporary measure until the correct 
whakapapa can be identified.  Secondly, the emphasis on returning Toi Moko to the land 
shoes support for Māori tikanga in such situations, as detailed above.  Finally by 
initiating efforts to secure return of remains hundreds of years after the rest of the body 
was disposed of, the New Zealand Government supports the conception that the human 
corpse has an eternal value to loved ones and, indicates that the right to redress for 
interference with proper burial is similarly continuous.  This author views the example of 
  
184  Robert K Paterson, above n 183. 
185  Above n 183. 
186  See inter alia “Preserved heads given burial rites” The Press (Christchurch, 5 Apr 1999) at 9; 
Bernadette Courtney “Preserved Head Collection Grows as Tribes Consulted” The Dominion Post 
(Wellington, 7 June 1999) at 7; Paul Kelbie “Maoris Win Return of Preserved Heads Hidden Away in 
Museum” The Independent (London, 24 June 2004) at 19 and Nikki Macdonald “Māori Remains 
Welcomed Home” The Dominion Post (Wellington, 23 Nov 2005) at A2. 
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Toi Moko as support for the proposition of property rights as has been advocated for in 
this paper.   
  
VII Conclusion 
 
This paper has conveyed the difficulty with the status quo in its failure to protect the role 
of the family in the treatment of the body of a loved one.  The anguish of the 
Takamore/Clarke family, along with the Gravatts' difficulty in recovering Zac's remains 
has exemplified the need for a greater level of clarity with regard to the processes 
involved after death.  Such clarity will not come from more of the same; cases decided on 
their facts in order to avoid making the big decisions.  There is room both practically and 
principally for a proprietary right in bodies after death and thus the law ought to be 
reformed accordingly.   
 
In its recent issue paper the Law Commission calls for comments as to whether or not 
there is room for increased autonomy in matters after death.  As this paper has argued, 
there is room, and the best way to advance this is through the creation and 
acknowledgment of an exclusive property right.  At present the legal framework does not 
accord with our common conception of the role of the family in the matters after death.  
The responsibility of dealing with proper burial and managing collective grief falls to the 
family and yet it is often not possible for family members to exercise their role as they 
would wish. 
 
The proposal outlined in this paper need not be viewed as a drastic, dangerous descent 
into the depths of liberalism; the current right conferred on an executor is of much the 
same kind as is proposed.  The difference being, with the recognition of a property right 
the families will have a more effective method of redress; the strength of the common 
law's strongest remedy when interference with their right occurs.  Moreover this paper 
has explained how the acknowledgement of a proprietary right will likely have a 
significant effect on the perceptions of the roles for individuals and groups concerned, 
which in turn will increase much needed certainty. 
 
The crux of this paper's argument has hindered on the importance of a property right in 
order to facilitate adherence to tikanga and tangihanga.  The status quo often makes the 
collective decision-making, crucial to Māori society, an impossibility with regard to the 
treatment of bodies after death.  This ought to be resolved and avoided going forward.  It 
is crucial that the wishes of the deceased are not preferred over those of the living, the 
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proposed framework would allow for family members to revert to the deceased's wishes 
if this was in fact their wish, but there would be no duty or expectation for this to happen.  
In addition, following the rules of succession allows for the acceptance of a collective 
ownership right, an important signal to all (especially Māori) of the value of these matters 
being dealt with in the collective, whānau group.   
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